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                         Israel’s Security Nexus as Strategic Restraint  
                                  The Case of Iran 2009-2013 
 
 
 
                                             Abstract 
This article examines the debates in Israel between 2009 to 2013  over   Iran’s 
nuclear programme as a reflection  of a particular  type of civil-military or civil-
security relationship.  It analyses how key actors within that relationship -   
particularly those with an intelligence background - engaged with  media outlets in 
Israel and further afield  to influence domestic and international opinion  over how 
best to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In so doing, it seeks to address one 
fundamental question: are governments in Jerusalem any longer the final arbiters 
over deciding what is in the national security interests of the State of Israel? 
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Introduction 
 
 On 5 November 2012, Israel’s Channel 2 investigative  programme Uvda 
(Fact), broadcast a feature alleging that two years previously - the exact date 
remained unclear -  Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and the former Minister of 
Defence, Ehud Barak, gave orders for the Israeli Air Force to begin preparations for a 
strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. The order, issued as a ‘P-Plus’, a designation 
that indicates action in readiness for war, was met with  immediate resistance from 
the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazi, the Head of Israel’s external 
intelligence agency, the Mossad, Meir Dagan as well as Yuval Diskin,  head of Israel’s 
internal security agency, the Shabbak.   Indeed, Dagan  was reported to have told 
both Netanyahu and Barak that  ‘You  are likely going to make an illegal decision to 
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go to war. Only the cabinet is authorised to do this’.1   The former Defence Minister, 
speaking on the same programme, denied that ‘P Plus’  necessarily meant  that such 
preparations indicated that an attack was likely, and rejected the allegation that any 
veto over military action, not least on the basis of a  position taken by the Chief of 
Staff, prevented the political echelon within government from authorising an attack.   
A later  statement widely attributed to Dagan  that Netanyahu had tried to 
‘steal a war’  certainly added context to the extraordinary comments   made by 
Dagan to a group of selected journalists  on the very day he relinquished his position 
as head of the Mossad on 6 January 2011.2  Rather than the usual valedictory speech 
followed by anodyne questions, Dagan, according to one of those present, launched 
a scathing  attack on the belligerent  sabre rattling that he felt had come to define 
Netanyahu’s policies and rhetoric towards Iran’s nuclear programme. For Dagan, not 
only was talk of Tehran constituting an existential threat to the existence of the 
Jewish State exaggerated, the apparent drift towards unilateral preventive military 
action placed Jerusalem increasingly at odds with Washington whose military and 
diplomatic support remains  the bedrock of  Israeli security.  Moreover, should such 
an attack be launched, the inevitable estrangement from Washington and Europe 
following on from a  preventative action of questionable legality   under international 
                                                 
1 Gili Gohen, ‘ Israel’s Security Chiefs rejected orders to prepare for Iran strike in 2010’, Ha’aretz (in 
Hebrew), 4 November 2012. The story was very quickly picked up by the foreign media. See for 
example Sheera Frenkel, ‘ I’m ready for war with Iran says PM, after army vetoed attack orders’, The 
Times, 6 November 2012; Harriet Sherwood, ‘ Israel “planned Iran attack” in 2010’, The Guardian, 5 
November 2010. 
2 Interview with Dr Ronen Bergman,  Chief Correspondent for Security and Intelligence Affairs for  
Yediot Aharanot, Tzhala, Tel Aviv, 1 August 2013.  
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law  would inevitably invite regional retaliation – not least on part of Iran’s close 
proxy Hezbollah -  but with Israel seemingly devoid of any tangible diplomatic assets 
with which to mitigate its own recourse to the use of overwhelming military force in 
return.   Certainly, Dagan’s statement just five months later that an Israeli military 
strike against Iran would be a ‘stupid thing’,  a remark made publicly during the 
course of an academic conference at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in May 
2011, was of a piece with his continued concern that the Israeli premier remained 
fixated on a course of action whose portends did not bode well for the future 
security of the State.3 
For some in Israel, Dagan’s outspoken comments were  welcomed, casting as 
they did an unflatteringly light on a Prime Minister and Defence Minister all too 
willing to allow historical analogy to inform current strategic thinking. Yet while 
senior officers  within the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and the intelligence services  
have found Netanyahu’s use of the Holocaust a somewhat crude rhetorical device in 
an attempt to rally world opinion, some directed their  ire at Dagan for, as one put it, 
                                                 
3 Ethan Bronner, ‘ A former spy chief questions the judgement of Israeli leaders’, The New York Times, 
3 June 2011; Yossi Melman, ‘ Ex-Mossad chief Dagan: Military Strike against Iran would be ‘Stupid’, 
Ha’aretz  (in Hebrew), 8 May 2011.  Well before Dagan’s outspoken remarks, another former head of 
the Mossad, Efraim Halevy had warned of the untold consequences of an attack on Iran that could 
last for a 100 years and as such, should only be considered as a last resort. See  ‘Ex-Mossad chief says 
strike Iran could “affect us for 100 years”’, Ha’aretz (in English), 26 July 2008. This view contrasted 
with that of his erstwhile colleague and predecessor as head of the Mossad, Shabtai Shavit who in 
20008 suggested that Israel had only a year to destroy Iran’s nuclear programme. See ‘Former Israeli 
spymaster: we have a year to hit Iran nukes’, Ha’aretz (in English), 29 June 2008.  
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‘washing Israel’s dirty laundry  in public’.4  To be sure, the debates over the 
likelihood or otherwise of an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities have now 
abated somewhat, the more constructive atmosphere following the agreement 
reached between the P5+1 and Tehran over the lifting of sanctions in exchange for 
robust monitoring of Iran’s nuclear programme  being largely responsible. Even so, 
Jerusalem has made it clear that a viable military option remains on the table should 
Iran, having successfully diluted what has been a harsh sanctions regime, 
subsequently be discovered  to still be developing a nuclear programme whose aim,  
ultimately, is to realise a nuclear  weapons capability.  
Examining the actual scope and intent  of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and Israel’s 
likely response is not the object of this article however. Rather, by focusing upon the 
period 2009-2013 when a unilateral strike by Israel appeared to be a real possibility  
it seeks to examine the debates  among and between  Israel’s security elite over how 
to confront the Iranian nuclear programme.  Conceptually, these debates have gone  
beyond the established  typology used previously  to describe  civil-military or civil-
security  relationships in Israel to encompass how key actors, particularly within the 
realm of intelligence engaged with, used, and in some cases abused ties to global 
media outlets  - not least in the United States - in order to try and  influence both 
public debate at home and international opinion abroad over how best to contain 
Iran. 
                                                 
4 Interview with Major General (Res) Amos Yadlin, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel 
Aviv, 29 July 2013. Yadlin is currently the Director of the  INSS. In 1981,  he  was one of the IAF pilots 
involved in the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osiraq and between 2006 and 2010  he was  
Director of  Agaf Modi’n (Military Intelligence Directorate of the IDF) 
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Taking as its starting point the idea of the security-network as a form of 
epistemic community (rather than a theory of civil-military relations in Israel),  and 
based on primary source  interviews with senior military and intelligence officials in 
Israel as well as close analysis of relevant secondary source material,   this  article 
examines the extent to which Israeli government  debate and policy towards Iran’s 
nuclear programme was influenced by what it terms a  ‘security nexus’.  This security 
nexus used media outlets to shape  internal and external public discourse over that 
strategy, a discourse which in turn informed the perceptions of state actors in 
Europe and North America. Moreover, the use of  global media outlets by Dagan in 
particular to air  his concerns over the likely consequences of unilateral  Israeli action 
against  Iran was but a logical extension of  how, from   the premiership of Ariel 
Sharon onwards,  Israeli intelligence officials in particular (my emphasis) increasingly 
played to a public gallery that had,  hitherto,  been kept in relative ignorance of their 
very  identity, let alone their actual activities, clandestine or otherwise on behalf of 
the state.  
The broader question that the article seeks to address is ultimately the  
influence exercised by  a security nexus that justifies  its actions in defence of Israel, 
maintains contact with the bureaucracies of state,   but  ultimately, through the use 
of global media outlets, operates beyond its sovereign control on matters related to 
national security. In short, on issues of strategic, yet alone existential concern, this 
article examines the extent to which elected Israeli governments  can actually  
remain the sole arbiters on deciding  what is, and what is not in the national security 
interest of the State.  
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From Security Network to Security Nexus 
 Not surprisingly for a state and society that has lived in various forms of 
protracted conflict with its neighbours, the literature dealing with civil-military 
relations in Israel is as vast as it is varied. Even so, the debates follow a continuum, 
ranging from what Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer have termed ‘Traditional 
Approaches’  that posit a military and its attendant institutions and structures   
formally subservient to the state, to more critical appreciations that highlight the 
fungible nature of the supposed boundaries that separate the military and civilian 
spheres beloved of such traditionalists.5 Such critical approaches highlight the 
functional nature of the relationship between the political and military spheres, not 
just in the process of ‘parachuting’  when senior officers made a seemingly effortless 
transition into party politics and government, but more importantly, in how the 
language and dominant discourse of security determined the scope and level of 
resource extraction by a professional military elite that reinforced the privileged 
position of the IDF in Israeli society.6 
                                                 
5 For a  traditional account of Israel’s civil-military relations see Amos Perlmutter, Politics and the 
Military in Israel 1967-77 (London: Frank Cass, 1978).  More critical accounts are to be found in Uri 
Ben Eliezer, The Making of Israeli Militarism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998); Yoram 
Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy (Washington, D.C: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 2006). Some academics have identified what they refer to as ‘waves’ in 
the study of civil-military relations in Israel. Foremost among these scholars is Stuart Cohen. See 
Stuart Cohen, Israel and its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion (London: Routledge, 2008), pp.1-15. 
6 Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer, ‘ The Study of Civil Military Relations in Israel’, in Oren Barak and 
Gabriel Sheffer, Militarism in Israeli Society (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), pp.17-18.  
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 With its intellectual debt to the post-modernist tradition very much to the 
fore,  New Critical Approaches focus more upon the cultural underpinnings of civil-
military relations in Israel, making the claim that the securitised nature of the state 
as it has emerged over seven decades of conflict has denied sufficient agency to civil 
society to counter what they see as the undeniable militaristic tone of public 
discourse across Israel.7  Like the Critical Approaches, the New Critical Approaches  
move beyond a model of civil-military relations based upon a rigid institutional and 
structural arrangements. The  emphasis instead  is placed upon the ‘informal political 
and social relationships’  between the political and military spheres that highlights 
the ‘cultural dimensions’ of an interface that at its core privileges a military culture.  
But because of the incomplete nature of the very process of state formation, a 
situation exacerbated by the legacy of the June 1967 war and the exact dominion to 
be claimed over the occupied territories, Barak and Sheffer conclude that the 
conceptual basis of both the Critical and New Critical Approaches  towards 
understanding the nature of civil-military relations in Israel remains constrained 
precisely because they remain grounded in a Western intellectual tradition that has 
taken insufficient account of the Israeli condition.8  
Taking  as  their conceptual point of departure, Barak and Oren went on to 
develop the idea of  a ‘security network’ as key to understanding contemporary civil-
military relations in Israel, and not least in an era when the proportion of former 
                                                 
7 Barak and Sheffer, ‘ The Study of Civil-Military Relations in Israel’, in  Militarism in Israeli Society,  
pp.18-21. 
8  Barak and Sheffer,  ‘ The Study of Civil-Military Relations in Israel’, in Militarism in Israeli Society , 
p.21.  
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high ranking army officers actually serving in government  -  a manifestation of 
parachuting - has been much diminished. As they argue: 
Our approach is to view these (civilian and military) sectors as consisting of many 
actors that intermingle very closely and form a highly informal policy network – the 
Security Network. This analytical and theoretical approach takes into consideration 
the increased penetration of  active and retired personnel of the security sector into 
most of the civilian sphere, which it seems has no parallel [elsewhere] in effective 
democratic states, and which, moreover, is not balanced by control of the state’s 
security sector.9 
 
Noting that such networks are the inevitable result of a particular process of 
state formation under conditions of perpetual conflict and regional  atrophy, they 
conclude by adding that ‘Our concept of Israel’s security network thus connotes a 
complex and fluid type of relationship between security and civilian  actors, but one 
that is ultimately capable of shaping the policymaking process as well as determining 
concrete policies.’  The most obvious example of this cited by Barak and Sheffer is 
opposition to proposed defence cuts in which  the epistemic weight  of the  security 
network has often proved  decisive in warding off the more substantive savings 
demanded by successive Israeli finance ministers.10 
The security network approach developed by Barak and Sheffer  does  offer a 
more sophisticated account of  civil-military relations  in Israel, not least because the 
very term can account for the role of intelligence, and the increasing public roles 
                                                 
9 Barak and  Sheffer, ‘ The Study of Civil-Military Relations in Israel’, in Militarism in Israeli Society, 
p.25.  
10 Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer. ‘ Israel’s “Security Network” and its impact: an exploration of a new 
approach’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 38/2 (2006), pp.251-53.  The argument was 
elaborated still further in Gabriel Sheffer and Oren Barak, Israel’s Security Networks: A Theoretical and 
Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
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played by serving and former senior members of Israel’s intelligence agencies – 
Directorate of Military Intelligence (Agaf Modi’in), the Mossad and the Shabbak –  to 
be included as part of such a network.  That said, the framework developed by them 
probably carries more weight  in terms of its analytical value than as a theoretical 
construct. Indeed, one obvious criticism is that Barak and Sheffer impute a unity of 
purpose as well as influence to the network that remains consistent over a range of 
issues, rather than contingent on the very context surrounding  any one or a number 
of issues. The controversy for example surrounding the documentary film The 
Gatekeepers would suggest that despite the deeply held view of six former heads of 
the Shabbak that Israel’s continued occupation of the West Bank was untenable, 
internal political considerations of an often visceral if not ideological  nature 
continue to determine actual state policy towards the Palestinians.11  For the 
purposes of this article, the salient  point is  not only the lack of unity between  these 
former practitioners and the politicians – dissonance that has perhaps been 
consistent  if hidden over time – but why such dissonance has now spilled over in to 
the public domain. As will be noted later, this particular zeitgeist is very much the 
result of a shift in the nature of security-media relations that dates back to the al-
Aqsa intifada. 
                                                 
11 The Gate Keepers (ףסה ירמוש) Directed by  Dror Moreh, Cinephil, Israel, released 2012.  A longer 
version of the documentary was broadcast in Israel where, inevitably it proved controversial, not least 
among some former security officials who felt the comments expressed were a betrayal of those who 
had operated under the command of those interviewed. Nonetheless, it was met with widespread 
international acclaim and was nominated for the category of Best Documentary in the 2012 Academy 
Awards.  
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As such, it is perhaps more accurate to develop the idea of a   ‘security nexus’ 
which emerged in response to the more bellicose stance of Netanyahu. This nexus is 
defined here as a tangible  connection between  an epistemic community and the 
actual issue involved so that members of this community coalesce around their 
interest or expertise and unite in their desire to effect an outcome as it relates to the 
specific issue at hand. This moves the debate beyond the idea of a ‘network’ posited 
by Barak and Sheffer.  While  they highlight the intimate nature of a network that 
cuts across both civilian and military spheres, it remains intangible much  beyond 
their   emphasis upon the  influence it wields  over the allocation of budgets and 
resources to the defence and security sector. Indeed, their analysis is too 
parsimonious  in its approach, embracing as it does a reductionism that does not 
move much beyond describing the informality of these ties.12  
By contrast, the focus on a ‘nexus’ highlights the contingent nature of the 
relationship between those that constitute the nexus and the issue involved. The 
nexus therefore constitutes individuals who may profoundly disagree  on a range of 
other issues but share a platform to exert particular influence over a shared concern  
at a particular time. In short, the nexus is not just about the scope of the individual 
relationship but how the cumulative effect of the relationship links to and influences 
a given issue. This linkage or engagement might be temporary and indeed might well  
fracture precisely because of the short-term  nature and scope of interest  of the  
                                                 
12  For example, see Guy Rolnik, ‘ Is Israel’s defense establishment a giant interest group?’, Ha’aretz 
(in English) 28 January 2014.  In this interview, Sheffer concluded that the security network worked to 
entrench a particular understanding among the Israeli public of the conflict with the Palestinians that 
helped in the process of resource allocation.  
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constituency concerned. Even so, in the case of the debate over Iran, this security 
nexus was defined by  1)  the  epistemic weight and therefore influence the 
intelligence backgrounds of  members of the nexus in particular could exercise 
among  target audiences and  2)  the ability of its  members on this single issue of 
Iran  to connect with and influence public debate both in Israel but  equally 
importantly,  across Europe and  North America through effective use of global  
media outlets. In short, the concern expressed by so many retired  Israeli security 
officials associated with this nexus -   a concern that utilised a symbiotic relationship 
that had come to mark intelligence-media relations in Israel over the previous 
decade  -  proved  influential, as later conceded by Barak,  in hardening Washington’s 
opposition towards any unilateral strike by Jerusalem against Tehran.13   
 
Media-Security Relations in Israel 
As with the changing nature of civil-military relations in Israel,  those 
between the media  and security establishment have , as Yoram Peri noted, 
developed over time, shaped by historical context, technological innovation and 
changes to the very social composition of Israel itself.  Once a  loyal partner in the 
process of state  creation and  consolidation and where the reified nature of security  
determined  what Peri termed a process  ‘deferential journalism’,  security-media 
relations from the 1980s onward began to become more hostile as the justification 
                                                 
13 Barak actually complained that  opposition to an attack that was felt at an elite level  was precisely 
because of what he termed  a ‘public scare campaign’.  Gide Weitz, ‘ Former PM Barak: To go nuclear, 
Iran is waiting for the world to be paralysed’, Ha’aretz (in Hebrew), 16 January 2015.  
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for the recourse to force, as well as how the IDF conducted itself came under 
increased public scrutiny. In part the shift was an inevitable response to the political 
events surrounding both the October 1973 war and nine years later, the public  
outcry across  Israel following its invasion of Lebanon.14  
Equally however, the shifting eddies of Israel as a society suggested a 
populace less deferential and more willing to voice outright scepticism of received 
wisdoms as they related to security issues. This reflected the decline of a centre-left 
political order that had always enjoyed a monopoly over the media outlets.  The  
election in 1977 of Israel’s first right-wing led  coalition  government for many 
marked the decline of mamlachtiyut – that particular form of Israeli statism  – in 
which  the media had, hitherto, largely  been subservient to parties of the centre left 
that had constituted the natural order of government.  While privately owned 
newspapers came to  dominate the print media, the advent of cable and digital 
platforms across Israel and with it, the deregulation of broadcasting from the 1990s 
onwards,  exposed Israelis to a global array of news sources that made it increasingly 
difficult for the successive governments  – that had previously relied upon  military 
censors – to exercise a monopoly over  the scope of security debates across Israel.  
As Peri noted, ‘Training accidents, commanders’ behaviour, service conditions, 
promotions, disagreements and power struggles in the military, criminal acts, 
corruption in the security system, all these and more, which in the past would never 
have become public knowledge, were addressed in great detail in the 1990s.’15 
                                                 
14 Yoram Peri, ‘The Media and the Military: From Collusion to Collision’, in Stuart A. Cohen (ed), 
Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp.186-87. 
15 Peri,’ The Media and the Military’, p.191. 
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Yet in one area of security, media scrutiny  remained absent by design rather 
than default: intelligence. To be sure, in most democratic states, media access to 
intelligence agencies remains limited at best, the perception being that as Shlomo 
Shpiro observed, ‘intelligence work depends on secrecy for its success’, and as such, 
‘should be kept out of the media entirely’.  In the case of Israel, this had become 
almost an article of faith, leading to what Shpiro termed a ‘controlled exclusion 
model’ in which the Mossad in particular had always looked to 1) suppress 
operational revelations 2) threaten or punish uncooperative media outlets 3) use of 
the media where necessary to enhance Israeli deterrence.16 This was not always 
entirely successful. The  media exposure  of the murder of a Palestinian terrorist  by 
Shabbak officers after the successful storming of a hijacked bus in April 1984, despite 
claims that all the terrorists had been killed during the actual course of the rescue 
operation  remains the most salient example.  As a rule however, the trinity that 
underpins the ‘exclusion model’  has long circumscribed the extent to which 
journalists can probe independently the operational, as well as legal jurisdictions of 
Israel’s intelligence community. As  journalist and intelligence historian, Dr Ronen 
Bergman argued, coverage of Israel’s intelligence community remains opaque at 
best, with no effective public oversight even of the annual budget devoted to 
intelligence which should fall within the purview of the sub-committee of the 
Foreign and Intelligence committee of the Israeli Knesset.17 
                                                 
16 Shlomo Shpiro, ‘Media Strategies of  Intelligence Services’, International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, 14/4 (2001), pp.494-95. 
17 Interview with Dr Ronen Bergman,  Chief Correspondent for Security and Intelligence Affairs for  
Yediot Aharanot, Tzhala, Tel Aviv, 1 August 2013.  
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But while the totem of national security has long determined media access to 
the IDF and intelligence services, relatively little has   been written over the extent to 
which senior security officials have now developed and used media connections  to 
express particular positions or indeed, articulate alternative perspectives on a given 
issue that may run counter to the policies of the elected government of the day.  In 
part, the ability of senior security officials to do so, not least within the intelligence 
services, was  a product of the very secrecy and clandestine activity surrounding 
their work: the  idea of privileged access to the inner thoughts and views of 
intelligence operatives is by its nature, seductive. This however is context rather 
than cause. For the tendency of  senior security officials in Israel to be more 
forthcoming on issues of strategic as well as operational concern is as much a 
product of  how the very nature of  government relations with the media  has 
developed over the past decade.  
Until the al-Aqsa intifada, it was a truism that the IDF and intelligence 
agencies were answerable to the government, not to the public with  advice given 
behind closed doors. Yet the typology of violence visited upon Israelis by various 
Palestinian militant groups,  not least of which was  the use of suicide bombers 
against civilian targets inside Israel proper created a widespread sense of insecurity 
among Israelis which, despite the best efforts of  the IDF and intelligence services   - 
appeared endemic. The public perception that the niceties of international 
diplomacy prevented the government of Ariel Sharon from using the full might of the 
IDF to deliver a crushing blow to the Palestinian militant groups was best expressed 
in the rash of car bumper stickers extolling the government to ‘Let the IDF win’. This 
sentiment found a more emotive articulation in the words of the then IDF Chief of 
15 
 
Staff, Lieutenant General Moshe Ya’alon, who in comments made before the Knesset 
Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee  noted that the Palestinians  would have to 
internalise the fact that terrorism would not  ‘defeat us, will not make us fold’. He 
continued: 
If that deep internalization does not exist at the end of the confrontation, we will 
have an existential threat to Israel. If that is not burned into the Palestinian and [my 
emphasis] Arab consciousness, there will be no end to their demands on us. 
………That’s why this confrontation is so important. There has not been a more 
important confrontation since the War of Independence.18 
 
 The idea implicit  in this statement that the al-Aqsa intifada represented a 
existential threat best dealt with by pursuing absolute victory may have enjoyed 
public approbation but it did not reflect a sober appreciation of political realities or 
indeed strategic possibilities.  In 2003, the influential address by the then serving  
head of the Shabbak, Avi Dichter to the annual  Herziliya conference can be seen as a 
palliative to Ya’alon’s more strident war claims, reminding his audience that while 
significant successes has been scored against Palestinian militant groups, security 
could never  be absolute.19  
 The importance of Dichter’s speech was less however in the actual message 
than in  the  fact that it was delivered in an open forum and aimed directly at the 
Israeli public. It was the first time that a serving head of one of Israel’s security 
                                                 
18 Ari Shavit, ‘ The enemy within’, Ha’aretz Magazine (in English) 30 August 2002. Ya’alon has since 
gone on to become a Likud Knesset Member and Minister of Defence.  While still noted for his hard 
line attitudes towards security, he does advocate a political settlement with the Palestinians.  
19 Uri Ben Eliezer, Old Conflict, New War: Israel’s Politics towards the Palestinians (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), p.165. According to this account and with the blessing of Ariel Sharon,  Dichter told 
his surprised audience ,  ‘ One has to say with candour:  the security establishment and the Shin Bet 
did not provide the nation of Israel  with the protective vest it deserved’. 
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services had made a such statement  at the behest of the serving Prime Minister, 
Ariel Sharon, while a conflict was ongoing (my emphasis)  regarding the limits of 
Israeli power. Crucially, in giving this address, Dichter became a powerful player in 
the interface between the government and the public, in effect becoming  a means 
by which Israeli governments now justified security policy,  with the ‘authority’ of 
intelligence  in particular used to validate often difficult decisions as they related to 
national security.20  Such cover became even more visible in the actions of Prime 
Ministers Ehud Olmert and his successor, Benyamin Netanyahu over the price Israel 
was will to pay to secure the release of  Gilad Shalit, an IDF conscript abducted in the 
summer of 2006  by members of Hamas close to the border with the Gaza strip.  The 
advice given to Olmert by Yuval Diskin, Dichter’s successor  as director of the 
Shabbak,  not to condone the asymmetric release of Palestinian prisoners to secure 
the release of Shalit was made public, giving  political  cover to the Prime Minister’s 
position as public pressure mounted for his  freedom. Equally, Netanyahu again 
made known the recommendations of the Shabbak when, in 2011, Shalit was 
released by his captors in exchange for 1027 Palestinians held in Israeli gaols.21 
 For Efraim Halevy, former director of the Mossad between 1998 and 2002, 
the precedent set by Dichter back in 2003 had a profound impact not just on 
relations  between government and security agencies, but in the dynamic that has 
now come to shape  perceptions of the intelligence services in the public domain. 
Senior figures in the intelligence services now had what he termed a new ‘client’, the 
court of public opinion. As such, public opinion now had an increasing impact on 
                                                 
20 Interview with Ambassador Efraim Halevy,  Ramat Aviv, Israel, 1 August 2013.  
21 Interview with Ambassador Efraim Halevy,  Ramat Aviv, Israel, 1 August 2013. 
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reputations and indeed legacies of senior security officials  that are  increasingly 
subject to media scrutiny. In this new environment, these  security officials in turn 
proved equally  keen to court the media.22 Accordingly, Halevy’s successor, Meir 
Dagan was feted by Ehud Olmert  in front of the national press towards the end of 
his rather acrimonious tenure as Prime Minister. Indeed, lacking the status of the 
first generation of politicians and nation builders and tarnished, however unfairly, by 
his conduct of the 2006 war with the Hezbollah, Olmert looked to recover trust in his  
security decision-making by courting clear practitioner endorsement. In turn, this 
boosted the public status of the security practitioner – in this case Dagan – while 
concurrently, nurturing public acceptance of the practice of officials and former 
officials expressing open opinions on matters of national security.  
 Stating that the people of Israel owed Dagan a great debt of gratitude (and 
perhaps hoping too that these not so subtle hints over Dagan’s clandestine successes 
might, for a man mired in corruption allegations, offer him some mitigation in the 
court of public opinion)  Olmert again allowed the head of an  intelligence agency a 
platform for wider engagement with the public, not least over policy towards Iran. 
Indeed, throughout Dagan’s tenure as Director of the Mossad, a series of what one 
senior security official called ‘Whispers’ was allowed to filter down  through selected 
media outlets to the wider Israeli public, a process  designed to assuage concern 
over  Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.23 These whispers included un-attributable leaks to 
                                                 
22 Interview with Ambassador Efraim Halevy,  Ramat Aviv, Israel, 1 August 2013. 
23 A case in point is Israel’s destruction of the Syrian nuclear  reactor at Al-Kibar in north eastern Syria,  
close to the Euphrates in September 2007.  Several discreet leaks were made to overseas news 
outlets which were quickly picked up by news agencies in Israel  regarding a mysterious air raid on an 
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the media regarding  the assassination of key Iranian personnel associated with the 
Iranian nuclear programme,  as well as details of ‘Stuxnet’, a computer virus 
developed allegedly by the United States  National Security Agency in collaboration 
8200 of Agaf Modi’in, which infected the centrifuges used by Iranian scientists to 
enrich uranium.24 
 Having therefore  come out of the intelligence closet, public opinion in Israel 
now had the potential to shape  the reputation of security chiefs, undermining the 
hitherto long-standing principle that such officials remain beholden to the 
government, rather than the people as intelligence officials became sensitive to 
issues surrounding their legacy.  Whereas previously, only the Director of Military 
Intelligence would appear before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Intelligence 
Committee,  the dropping of the veil of secrecy over the chiefs of the Shabbak and 
Mossad now saw them subject to the judgement of the wider Israeli society. Equally 
however, this exposure to the court of  public opinion allowed security officials a 
platform upon which to engage increasingly  in more open debate on defence and 
security issues once they have left office.  Nowhere has this been more powerfully 
seen than in the very public way former (and some serving ) security officials   - the  
security nexus - engaged with and indeed used a variety of media outlets, both 
                                                                                                                                            
unidentified target in Syria. The story eventually appeared in Ha’aretz and the New Yorker magazine 
in 2012. See Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, ‘Revealed for the first time: A mission in Syria that never 
took place’, Ha’aretz (in English), 10 August 2012; David Makovsky, ‘The Silent Strike: How Israel 
bombed a Syrian nuclear installation and kept it secret’, The New Yorker Magazine, 17 September 
2012, pp.24-40.  
24 On the impact of the  Stuxnet virus in particular  see Sean Rayment, ‘ Cyber Wars’ The Sunday 
Telegraph, 26 June 2011.  
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national and  international to deliver often stinging critiques of the approach and 
policies of the Netanyahu government towards halting Iran’s nuclear programme.  
 
The ‘Nexus’ as Security Restraint 
 In September 2010, the Atlantic Monthly in the United States published an 
article by one of its most noted columnists, Jeffrey Goldberg, titled ‘The Point of no 
Return’.  Consisting of a series of reported discussions with senior Israeli officials and 
culminating in the recorded comments of Prime Minister Netanyahu over Iran’s 
nuclear programme, the article was seen widely at the time as preparing opinion 
both in Israel and the United States for the increased likelihood of a unilateral strike 
against Tehran’s nuclear facilities by the end of that year or early 2011.  Impatience 
with what he perceived as a weak sanctions regime and the reluctance of the Obama 
Administration to engage with a security threat widely seen in Israel as of equal 
menace to the security of the  Gulf states as well as the  regional interests of the 
United States underscored Netanyahu’s position.25   
Little over 16 months later, a similar article of equal stridence  -  this time an 
interview by Ronen Bergman with the then Defence Minister Ehud Barak  - was 
published in  The New York Times. While noting the undoubted clandestine 
successes scored against the Iranian nuclear programme, ranging from infecting 
centrifuges at the Natanz reactor with  the stuxnet computer virus through to the 
assassination of key scientists and the sabotage of military installations associated 
                                                 
25 Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Point of no Return’, The Atlantic Magazine, September 2010 at 
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/print/2010/09/the-point-of-no-return/8186 Accessed 6 September 
2010. 
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with the programme, the article concluded that such measures could only delay, 
rather than halt the progress of Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. Bergman concluded his 
piece by declaring that:  
After speaking with many Israeli leaders and Chiefs of the military and intelligence, I 
have come to believe that Israel will indeed strike Iran in 2012. Perhaps in the small 
and ever diminishing window that is left, the United States will choose to intervene 
after all, but here, from the Israeli perspective, there is not much hope for that. 
Instead, there is  that peculiar Israeli mixture of fear – rooted in the sense that Israel 
is dependent on the tacit support of other nations to survive  - and tenacity, the 
fierce conviction right or wrong, that only the Israelis can ultimately defend 
themselves.26 
 
 Between the publication of these two interviews however, something 
profound happened to the security discourse in Israel. Of course, the issue of how to 
deal with Tehran’s nuclear ambitions and crucially, the advisability of a preventive 
strike against its key facilities  was one that cut across ideological and party loyalties 
in Israel.27   Public debate over military operations is of course widespread in Israel 
but this, for the most part has been after the fact.28  The debate over Iran’s nuclear 
                                                 
26 Ronen Bergman, ‘ Will Israel attack Iran’, The New York Times, 25 January 2012 at 
www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/magazine/will-israel-attack-iran.html? 
Accessed  22 July 2013. 
27 Interview with former  member of the National Security Staff, Tel Aviv 31 July 2013. This individual 
had extensive experience of dealing with Iran. Name withheld on request. 
28 One comparable example is what has been called the ‘revolt of the generals’, when, in the run up to 
the June 1967, senior IDF officers made in clear to the public that Israel’s security was being 
undermined by the timidity of the elected politicians. The argument that the IDF effected bullied the 
government of Levi Eshkol into condoning pre-emptive strikes against Syria and Egypt, action that 
usurped civilian control of the military has however been challenged by more recent scholarship. See 
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programme  was very different, not least because it has been conducted before the 
fact and involved outright opposition from what have been called Le’sheavar (the 
Formers) a euphemism for ex-security officials and how, in turn, use of the media by 
this security nexus  turned increasingly toward  a global audience in order to 
influence and/or pressure the elected government of the day in the courts of both 
domestic  and international  opinion.29   
 The term nexus, rather than network to describe those opposed to unilateral 
Israeli action might appear to be the semantic equivalent of splitting hairs. But in this 
case at least its serves a discrete purpose, highlighting, as outlined previously,  an 
alignment of security officials – both serving and retired and most with intelligence 
backgrounds – concentrated upon one issue of existential importance to the State. 
This sets it apart from a ‘ security network’ as described by Barak and Oren whose 
emphasis, however informal, remains largely focused on resource allocation shared 
by serving and former security officials over time and where unity of purpose defines 
broad policy goals. This is not  the case with the position taken by the security nexus 
over Iran. Public statements made by Dagan, for example, have been criticised by  
other  retired security officials who have argued they damaged Israel’s deterrent 
credibility (if not its capability). Former Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), Amos 
Yadlin called such statements unethical, noting that if Dagan had felt so deeply about 
government policy towards Iran during his tenure as Mossad director he should have 
resigned.  During his own tenure as DMI, Yadlin felt aggrieved that having invested 
                                                                                                                                            
Mordechai Bar-On, ‘ The Generals “Revolt”: Civil-Military Relations in Israel on the Eve of the Six Day 
War’, Middle Eastern Studies, 48/1 (2012), pp.33-50. 
29 Interview with former  member of the National Security Staff, Tel Aviv 31 July 2013 
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so much treasure and man hours trying to penetrate the Iranian programme, 
Dagan’s actions, de facto, had given Tehran  access to policy debate in Jerusalem 
virtually for free.30 
  Even so, the politics of personality clearly played a part in much of this often 
bitter dialogue. Perhaps the most stinging criticism of Netanyahu and former 
Defence Minister Barak came from Yuval Diskin,  director  of the Shabbak between 
2005-2011. Along with Dagan and Ashekenazi, he was known to have opposed 
unilateral action against Iran while in office, concerned in particular that any decision 
to attack had not been discussed or condoned by the security cabinet.31   Reflecting 
on his time in office and his dealings with several Israeli Prime Ministers and Cabinet 
members, Diskin opined during  the course of an interview with the popular Israeli 
newspaper Yediot Aharanot  that, ‘ Unfortunately, my feeling, like the feeling of 
many others in the defence establishment is that for Netanyahu and Barak, personal, 
opportunistic interests come first. ‘ He continued: 
It’s easy, all you need to do is decide – lets strike Iran. But once we’ve entered such 
circumstances, would they, these two, Bibi (Netanyahu) and Barak  - be capable of 
actually attaining the desired results for the State of Israel?  Seeing as I have these 
people in quite a few operations and under various circumstances in the current 
term and in the past, I and many of my colleagues do not feel secure in their ability 
to lead such a move. We don’t feel comfortable with their motives.32 
 
                                                 
30 Interview with Major General (Res) and former Head of  Agaf Modi’n (Military Intelligence 
Directorate of the IDF) Amos Yadlin, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv, 29 July 
2013 
31 Amos Harel, ‘ Former Mossad chief briefed comptroller about Iran strike plans’, Ha’aretz (in 
Hebrew), 2 December 2011.  
32 Dror Moreh, ‘ Diskin: Bibi, Barak motivated by personal interests’, Yediot Aharanot (in Hebrew) 6 
January 2013.  
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 It was view shared by a  former  Director of Military Intelligence, Major 
General Uri Saguy. He too was candid in his assessment of what he saw as the 
rhetorical excesses of Netanyahu and Barak towards Iran, likening it to someone who 
lights a fire and then demands it be put out by others. He continued that the ‘either 
or scenarios’ depicted by Netanyahu were ‘blatantly unreasonable’.33  While of a 
piece with the opinions  expressed by   Dagan,  it was Diskin’s  acerbic  views 
however  that quickly drew the ire from  those within  the  wider security 
establishment  as well as those within the media concerned over the net effect such 
comments had upon  Israel’s deterrent capability. By undermining the impression of 
purpose and unity at the heart of Israel’s security establishment, the danger was,  as 
Ari Shavit,  a columnist with Ha’aretz noted,  that it would lessen pressure on 
Washington and the Europeans to enforce a tight sanctions regime to offset a likely 
attack if the Israeli threat lacked credibility.34    
 But while the arguments of Diskin and Dagan reflected an earnest belief that 
Netanyahu was preparing to launch a strike without due consideration of the 
regional consequences, this was only  part of the issue. The fact that they were able 
to express their concerns and views  in such a public manner was the inevitable 
consequence of shifts in the relationship between the security establishment and 
the media, shifts that were initially encouraged by party and personal interests in 
                                                 
33 Amir Oren, ‘Former Israeli intelligence chief: Netanyahu and Barak dangerously stoking  flames of 
war’, Ha’aretz (in English), 17 August 2012.  
34 Tony Karon, ‘ Israel’s “Threat” to bomb nuclear facilities is central to its Iran strategy’, at 
http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011.07/22/israels-threat-to-bomb-nuclear-facilities-is-central-to-
its-iran-strategy/#ixzz1Sqf7mT60  22 July 2011 accessed  on 25 July 2011.  
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government but which now had moved beyond government  control. The result, as 
the debate over striking Iran intensified across Israel, was that men like Diskin and 
Dagan used their media skills and profile acquired while in government service, to 
now push alternative agendas that may or may not be to the benefit of state 
security. As Efraim Halevy noted: 
The current balance of media relations with the security-intelligence community is 
not healthy: who is using who? Who is accountable to who? Mechanisms of [Israeli] 
government accountability are not fit for purpose in that many feel that the former 
security chiefs are omnipotent, that they themselves are above the fray and because 
of their position and expertise they are not accountable to the political echelon.35 
 
 But as a former head of the Mossad, Halevy too  appeared in the Israeli 
media to criticise the tone of the language (but not the decision-making process 
itself) used by Netanyahu in trying to shape public attitudes towards the potential 
use of force against Iran.  Constant reference for example to the Holocaust  had been 
counterproductive Halevy felt,  conveying the impression of a brittle state faced by 
an existential threat soon to enter what Barak referred to as a ‘zone of immunity’ 
from attack.  While acknowledging that a nuclear Iran would be a grave matter for 
Israel, he stated in an interview with Ha’aretz in September 2012 that:  
I am absolutely appalled when I hear our leaders talking as though there were no 
Israel Defence Forces and as though there were no State of Israel and as though 
Auschwitz is liable to be repeated. As I see it, the message we should be conveying 
to the Iranians – and to ourselves -  is that we will be here in any event and in any 
scenario for the next two thousand years.36 
 
 As influential as such interviews have been in shaping Israeli domestic 
opinion – and opinion polls taken between 2011-13  suggested a slim  majority of 
                                                 
35 Interview with Ambassador Efraim Halevy,  Ramat Aviv, Israel, 1 August 2013. 
36 Ari Shavit, ‘ Former Mossad Chief: An attack on Iran likely to foment a generations long war’, 
Ha’aretz (in English), 1 September 2012.  
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Israelis remained opposed to any unilateral strike without the express support and 
better still, involvement of the United States -  the permissive media environment 
described by Halevy now saw members of the security nexus  embrace a wider 
global audience.37 Throughout 2012, Dagan in particular was the focus of attention 
in two consecutive articles in the New Yorker magazine published in September of 
that year, a magazine  in the United States known for its Democratic party 
sympathies.  
At a time when the personal, let alone diplomatic ties  between the first 
Obama presidency and Netanyahu were testy at best, this was no coincidence. The 
first article, written by David Remnick  focused upon Dagan but was in effect an 
expose of the fractious relations that had developed between so many within Israel’s 
security establishment on the one hand, and Netanyahu and Barak on the other. The 
second, which followed 14 days later, gave extensive details of the reasoning and 
rationale behind Israel’s destruction of the Syrian nuclear facility at al-Kibar, an 
action undertaken when Dagan headed the Mossad and enjoyed a close working 
relationship with the incumbent Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert. The inference was 
clear: the security nexus could and would sanction strikes where necessary and 
carefully calibrated.  What Barak and Netanyahu proposed however was 
unnecessary precisely because the perceived gains had not been measured against 
                                                 
37 See for example the poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute (Peace Index) in February 
2012. From a sample of 600 respondents, 62.9 per cent of those Israelis  questioned opposed an 
attack on Iran without the support of the United States. The poll data can be accessed at 
https://owa.dur.ac.uk/owa/redir.aspx?C=SjCEIxlsn0Kn7gcnTa0rjnj2FgcGy9IIIbetzPrZzmZkTK3KFh27c
WYl28WtlTnlNxw6Oj_lk4A.&URL=http%3a%2f%2fwww.peaceindex.org%2ffiles%2fThe%2520Peace%2
520Index%2520Data%2520-%2520February%25202012.pdf Accessed 25 September 2015. See also ‘ 
Ha’aretz Poll: Israelis split over military operation against Iranian nuclear facilities’, Ha’aretz (in 
English), 3 November 2011. 
26 
 
the  likely political, military  and indeed human costs.38  Indeed, while no one 
doubted that Israel had the ability to actually hit an array of targets in Iran, their 
ability to sustain an air campaign of the required duration and intensity  to lasting 
damage remained doubtful. The distance to be flown by the IAF would place  limits 
on the number of  sorties with adverse consequences for the actual  time over target  
across multiple sites, even with the use of standoff weaponry.  Any damage inflicted 
would most likely  be repaired relatively quickly by a regime  who no doubt would 
have  already  incorporated a  level of redundancy into their programme in 
anticipation of  such an attack.  
 Equally damaging perhaps would be the international opprobrium faced by 
Jerusalem for launching a preventative, as opposed to a pre-emptive strike that 
would be deemed illegal under international law, whose military effectiveness 
without Washington’s involvement was doubtful, and whose adverse impact on 
Israel’s ties across the region as well as wider relations with Europe and, most 
importantly, the United States would likely be profound.39  This argument in 
                                                 
38 See David Remnick, ‘Letter from Tel Aviv: The Vegetarian – A notorious spymaster becomes a 
dissident’, The New Yorker Magazine,  3 September 2012, pp.22-28;  Makovsky, ‘The Silent Strike: The 
New Yorker Magazine,  pp.24-40.  
39 Max Fisher, ‘ The UK thinks a strike on Iran would be illegal; denies US access to its bases’, The 
Washington Post , 25 October 2012.  Sensitive to the controversy surrounding its decision to support 
Washington in Afghanistan and more controversially, in the invasion of Iraq, the coalition government 
of David Cameron allegedly made it clear that even if the Obama Administration decided to launch air 
strikes against Iran, the UK would deny the United States access to ‘British airbases that are 
strategically located on remote islands’. This oblique reference to Diego Garcia was apparently 
contained in a legal advice circulated to the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of 
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particular weighed heavily on the minds of those like Amos Yadlin, the former 
Director of Israeli military intelligence  who otherwise felt that the diplomatic fall-out 
from any preventative attack could be managed and indeed, that any strike might be  
welcomed by many in the Sunni-Arab world and  Gulf states in particular.   In an 
interview published in September 2012 however,  he warned that ‘[O]ur legitimacy 
battery is almost empty. Above all, we must cease butting heads with the United 
States and try to reach a strategic understanding with it. Israel must shape a policy 
and take action to ensure that, if we are compelled to attack, the world will be 
behind us on the day that  we do so’. 40 
 Much of this argument,  analysis  and debate had appeared regularly in the 
Hebrew press between 2009-12  as well as in online English versions of Ha’aretz and 
Yediot Aharonot, giving  these articles a wider audience and therefore reach in North 
America and Europe. But even more profound were the television interviews given 
by Dagan to the prime time CBS current affairs programme 60 Minutes on 8  March 
2012 and  three months later to the BBC World News Television Programme 
Hardtalk. As networked international news stations, the opinions of the former 
Mossad director were now readily accessible to  a global audience and in English.41 
On reflection, this may have been a calculated gambit on the part of  Dagan for quite 
                                                                                                                                            
Defence which, while conceding that Iran had been engaging in illegal uranium enrichment, this was 
not clear evidence of intent to build a nuclear weapon.  
40 Ari Shavit, ‘ Former Intelligence Chief breaks his silence on Iran’, Ha’aretz (in Hebrew), 13 
September 2012. 
41 The interviews are still available on You Tube. The CBS 60 Minutes interview can be accessed at 
https://m/youtube.com/watch?v=1eC6oCmvQ0 ; The BBC Hardtalk  interview can be accessed at 
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reasonably, he could, given his previous  position at the very apex of Israel’s 
intelligence community, have made private entreaties to the White House.  Instead, 
by appearing on high profile news programmes, he deliberately appealed to the 
wider public in North America, making the risk of the United States being dragged 
into another Middle East war a real possibility for a country scared deeply by the 
invasion of Iraq and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, and for a President 
committed to the withdrawal of all United States troops from Iraq and Afghanistan 
by the end of his Presidency.  
 Of such appearances on  global news networks, Ehud Barak noted bitterly 
that the likes of Dagan ‘travel the world, and their words weaken the considerable 
achievement of Israeli policy where we made the Iranian issue a major, urgent issue, 
not only for Israel but for the world’.42  The irony of course is amid the rancour and 
acrimony between the government and security nexus, the end result can be used to 
justify the means both sides chose to impede Iran’s nuclear programme. For 
Netanyahu, the harsh rhetoric, the signalled preparations that  involved, for 
example, large scale air exercises over the Eastern Mediterranean, and his now 
infamous appearance before the UN security   waving a cartoon caricature of a bomb 
to indicate  how close Tehran was to attaining a  nuclear weapons capability, did  
convince all  it could be argued of Israel’s  earnest intentions should Tehran nuclear 
ambitions remain unchecked. The  severity of the sanctions regime subsequently 
imposed upon  Iran by the United States and the European Union  therefore can be 
seen  as vindication of this strategy, although even with the signing of the recent 
                                                 
42 Natan Sachs, ‘ Israel’s Spy Revolt’, Foreign Policy, 10 May 2012, at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/arricles/2012/05/10/israels_spy_revolt? Accessed 14 May 2012. 
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accord between the P5+1 and Iran in Lausanne,  Netanyahu remains convinced of  
Iran’s continued nuclear malfeasance.43 
 Equally, the Security Nexus could claim, with equal validity, that its actions 
have prevented a strike on Iran whose outcome could well have embroiled Israel in a 
regional conflagration whose outcome would have been far from certain, while 
allowing the international community time to construct a new security regime 
capable of containing Iran. Indeed, The United Kingdom seemed keen in particular to 
demonstrate to Jerusalem and indeed the wider Israeli public that these efforts   
went beyond the purely diplomatic endeavours of the P5+1. In the summer of 2012 
when fears of an Israeli strike were most pronounced in Washington and London,  
the Daily Telegraph disclosed on its front page details of a ‘private speech’ by Sir 
John Sawers concerning the success achieved by the British Secret Intelligence 
Service or MI6 in  thwarting  Tehran’s attempts to obtain a nuclear weapons 
capability.44  Perhaps more striking however were the apparent  revelations 
contained in a Mossad report, subsequently  shared with their South African 
                                                 
43 This was certainly the view of Ronen Bergman who believed that his article for the New York Times 
Magazine with Ehud Barak was taking very seriously by former US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta 
who  feared increasingly that Israel  was preparing  to strike between April and July 2012. Bergman 
believes that as a result, the White House, while placing pressure on Netanyahu to desist from any 
military action,  redoubled its efforts to impose harsher sanctions against Iran. Interview with Dr 
Ronen Bergman,  Chief Correspondent for Security and Intelligence Affairs for  Yediot Aharanot, 
Tzhala, Tel Aviv, 1 August 2013. See also Amos Harel, ‘ Bottom Line of Congress Speech: Iran Strike off 
the Table’, Ha’aretz, 6 March 2015.  
44 Christopher Hope, ‘We foiled Iranian nuclear weapons bid, says spy chief’, The Daily Telegraph, 13 
July 2012.  
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counterparts in October 2012  and leaked just over two years later to the The 
Guardian  newspaper and Al-Jazeera that claimed  Tehran did ‘not appear ready’ to 
enrich uranium to the 90 per cent required to build a nuclear weapon. This was a 
position that clearly stood at odds with Netanyahu’s more dire assessment.45  Such 
revelations aside however, the security nexus recognised that even in this apparent 
era of American retrenchment from the Middle East, the political and strategic ties 
with Washington remain the very foundation upon which Israeli defence policy  
rests. Any attack by Israel on Iran without the express permission of Washington 
would therefore likely  have incalculable consequences for Israel’s future security. 
Indeed, given what many regard as Israel’s development of its own deterrent 
capability based on a nuclear triad, living with a nuclear Iran might well be price 
worth paying when set against the potential loss of Washington as an ally.46  
                                                 
45 See a Seamus Milne. ‘ Secret cables reveal Israel’s spies at odds with Netanyahu on Iran’, The 
Guardian, 24 February 2015. These revelations were part of aider tranche of cables released by 
Wikileaks. Having left office over a year previously, it is unlikely Dagan would have had knowledge of 
this assessment although it clearly tilted towards his overall analysis.  
46 Several  recent  memoires published by senior military officials and policy-makers in London and 
Washington suggest that the threat of an Israeli preventative strike were taken seriously. In his 
autobiography, Lieutenant General Sir David Richards, former Chief of the  British Defence Staff  
disclosed  that the likelihood of such a strike was deemed by London to be  around 40-50 per cent in 
the summer of 2012.  See David Richards, Taking Command (London: Headline Publishing, 2014), 
pp.324-25.  During a visit to Europe in February 2012, former US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta 
disclosed to David Ignatius of  The Washington Post that he feared an Israeli strike within the next 
four months. Despite Panetta’s insistence that this was a private discussion, the subsequent  story 
made international headlines and  certainly contributed to the added  diplomatic momentum towards 
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 But whether one takes the view that Iran is an existential threat that must be 
confronted, or a strategic challenge  which, however malevolent towards Jerusalem, 
can be contained, the  cumulative impact on state-security relations over how to 
deal with Tehran  has been profound. A combination of a shift in the very nature of 
civil military relations, coupled with the shifting contours in the relationship between 
government, the media and senior intelligence  officials in particular  has now 
created a genie that cannot be put back easily in the bottle.   
 
Conclusion 
 On taking up his  post as Director of the Mossad in 1998, Efraim Halevy was 
only too well aware of the damage done to the intelligence agency by excessive 
media interest following the botched attempt by two of its operatives to assassinate  
Hamas leader, Khaled Meshal in Amman, Jordan.  As a consequence, he was 
determined to keep media intrusion surrounding Mossad operations to an absolute 
minimum, arguing that ‘Intelligence is a plant that can only grow in darkness’ and 
that absolute secrecy remained the bedrock of operational  success’. He concluded 
that ‘[O]ur ethos is not to be in contact with the media’.47 
 While Halevy’s words clearly pertained to operational matters, they have a 
contemporary resonance when examining the idea of a security nexus and how, as a 
distinguished epistemic community in that very realm, it can exercise influence (if 
not power) on an  international  scale. Indeed, debate over how Israel identifies and 
                                                                                                                                            
a harsher sanctions regime against Iran. See Leon Panetta, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in 
War and Peace (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), pp. 
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follows the contours of its own security needs became a global issue where Iran was 
concerned,  and one partly elevated to that international plane by the changing 
nature of the relationship described between the elected government on the one 
hand, and the media and security officials on the other. The Iran crisis accelerated 
(although did not cause) a shift away from responsibility of senior  officials to the 
elected  government of the day, and towards a reciprocal relationship with the 
public filtered through, at times, an all too indulgent media.  
There is of course the irony that for many in Israel and the wider world, the 
security nexus as described has been influential  in preventing a wider regional 
conflagration rather than its professional diplomats or indeed  elected politicians. 
More recently, other senior security officials too have raised their concerns over 
what one referred to as ‘Netanyahu’s needless fear mongering when it comes to  
Iran’s atomic aspirations’. Brigadier-General Uzi Eilam who for over a decade headed 
the Israel Atomic Energy Commission cast doubt on whether Iran even wanted to 
develop nuclear weapons, let alone possessed the technical ability to do so 
immediately. Instead, he felt it more likely that Tehran would prefer to remain a 
threshold state, able to exercise regional influence through latent fear that could 
intimidate its neighbours but without incurring the military wrath of Washington.48  
Given his own background in the development of Israel’s own nuclear and missile 
programmes and his access  to the intelligence assessments surrounding Iran’s 
nuclear programme, his epistemic authority was of a piece with that of the security 
nexus described.  
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In August 2015 Ehud Barak  revealed, albeit inadvertently,  that between 
2009 and 2012 Israel came closer to attacking Iran on four occasions.49 With the 
signing of the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran in July 2015, the risk of 
such strikes has been much reduced although  should Tehran be found to be in 
material violation of the accords Israel has made it clear it reserves the right to act in 
defence of its national interests.  But the essential dilemma for Jerusalem  and its 
influence on the future patterns of civil-military and civil-security relationships in 
Israel remains: the influence (if not power)  exercised by a security nexus that  is 
unelected, accountable to few, but able to effect the security  and foreign policy of 
the elected government of the day on issues of existential/strategic concern.  Given 
the nature of overall public trust in government in Israel, it is a dilemma that is 
unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 Barak David, ‘ Barak: Steinitz, Ya’alon thwarted Iran Strike in 2011’, Ha’aretz, 23 August 2015; Jodi 
Rudoren, ‘ Israel came close to attacking Iran, Ex-Defense Minister says’, The New York Times, 21 
August 2015. 
34 
 
Bibliography 
Barak, Oren and Gabriel Sheffer (eds), Militarism in Israeli Society (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2010). 
________________________________ . ‘ Israel’s Security Network and its Impact: 
An Exploration of a New Approach’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
38/2 (2006).  
_______________________________ . Israel’s Security Networks: A Theoretical and 
Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
Bar-On, Mordechai. ‘ The Generals “Revolt”: Civil-Military Relations in Israel on the 
Eve of the Six Day War’, Middle Eastern Studies, 48/1 (2012). 
Ben Eliezer, Uri. The Making of Israeli Militarism (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press 1998). 
____________ . Old Conflict, New War: Israel’s Politics towards the Palestinians 
(London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012). 
Cohen, Stuart (ed). Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces (London: Frank Cass, 
2000).  
___________ . Israel and its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion (London: Routledge, 
2008).  
Goldberg, Jeffrey. ‘ The Point of no Return’, The Atlantic Magazine, September 2010 
at www.theatlantic.com/magazine/print/2010/09/the-point-of-no-return/8186 
Accessed 6 September 2010. 
Makovsky, David. ‘ The Silent Strike: How Israel bombed a Syrian nuclear installation 
and kept it secret’, The New Yorker Magazine, 17 September 2012.  
 
35 
 
Panetta, Leon. Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2014).  
Peri, Yoram. Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy 
(Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006). 
Perlmutter, Amos. Politics and the Military in Israel 1967-77 (London: Frank Cass, 
1978). 
Remnick, David. ‘ Letter from Tel Aviv: The Vegetarian: A notorious Spymaster 
becomes a dissident’, The New Yorker Magazine, 3 September 2012.  
Richards,  Sir David. Taking Command (London: Headline Publishing, 2014).  
Sachs, Nathan. ‘Israel’s Spy Revolt’, Foreign Policy, 10 May 2012, at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/arricles/2012/05/10/israels_spy_revolt? Accessed 14 
May 2012. 
Shpiro, Shlomo. ‘ Media Strategies of Intelligence Services’, International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 14/4 (2001).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
